



Without Chrysippus there would have been no Stoa (D.L. 7. 183). Similar
assessments of Chrysippus' importance have been made in modem times,
most notably by Hans von Arnim, who claimed that Chrysippus' teachings
influenced Stoicism for centuries, and that the Roman Stoa was mainly
dependent on Chrysippus.^ Von Amim's views were later supported by
Max Pohlenz, who wrote, "die spatere Zeit kennt das stoische Lehrsystem
nur in der Form, die Chrysipp ihm gegeben hat."^ Such evaluations of
Chrysippus' influence seem exaggerated, but they emphasize that, among
Roman Stoics such as Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Chrysippus
had a position of prominence.^ Musonius Rufus, Epictetus' famous teacher,
seems an exception to the previous observation: In the fragments of his
works, preserved largely by Stobaeus, there is no mention of Chrysippus."*
There are at least two ways of explaining this situation: First, Musonius'
works are fragmentary, and Chrysippus may well have been mentioned in
what is now lost; and second, Chrysippus' influence on the first and
subsequent centuries A.D. was certainly not eclipsed by that of his
predecessors, Zeno and Cleanthes, who are mentioned by Musonius.
Indeed, since Epictetus himself mentions Chrysippus some fourteen times, it
would be most odd if his teacher Rufus had not known Chrysippus'
doctrines.
This study's scope is not, however, Chrysippus' influence on later
Stoics in general, but on Epictetus in particular. There are several reasons
for focussing on Epictetus. First, reports of his teachings by Arrian are
fairly extensive.^ Second, unlike Seneca or Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus was
' See von Amim. "Chrysippos 14." RE ra.2 (1899) 2502-09, and J. B. Gould's criiique in
The Philosophy ofChrysippus (Leiden 1971) 1-3 and 16-17.
^ M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa: Geschichle einer geistigen Bewegung I (Gotlingen 1948) 32.
^ See Gould (above, note 1) 10-14 for a brief survey of Chrysippus' importance for the
Roman Stoa.
'* See the indices to C. Musonii Rufi reliquiae, ed. O. Hense (Leipzig 1905) 144-48.
^ Arrian's role in recording Epictetus' teachings has been much discussed. Perhaps the best
conclusion is that of P. Stadter, who believes that truth lies somewhere between K. Hartmann's
view that the Discourses are verbatim transcripts and that of T. Winh, who believes that they
are Arrian's literary reworkings, so that one must not speak of Epictetus' Discourses, but of
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a full-time teacher of Stoicism, devoted to living and propagating his
philosophy within a circle of students and visitors to Nicopolis.^ Moreover,
Epictetus' teachings, as reported by Arrian, provide a relatively coherent
and limited scope for study, unlike the many and diverse writings of Seneca,
or the introspective, personal musings of Marcus Aurelius. To be sure,
Epictetus was not exactly a systematic thinker, and if Arrian 's transcripts
can be trusted, much of his teaching seems ad hoc, devoted to individuals
and to specific situations and topics. Still there are problems, not least of
which is the fragmentary state of Chrysippus' own voluminous works.
Moreover, the methodological principle which affects Posidonian studies
also affects Chrysippean, that is, whether to consider anything by
Chrysippus if not explicitly assigned to him by an ancient source. In what
follows, this principle will be observed, but there seems to be enough
known about Chrysippus' views to conjecture that some of Epictetus'
beliefs were probably influenced by him even if he is not explicitly
mentioned. Indeed, as Adolf Bonhdffer argued, Epictetus' doctrines were
primarily those of the early or ancient Stoa, not those of later Stoics. But in
his very admirable and learned studies^ Bonhoffer seldom discussed
Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus at length, and doctrines of Chrysippus
are often treated together with those of Zeno, Cleanthes and other early
Stoics. Bonhoffer's works thus need careful reading, but even then no clear
conception of Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus emerges. Josiah Gould's
The Philosophy of Chrysippus has a brief account of Chrysippus' influence
on Epictetus, usually relying on Ludwig Edelstein's methodological
principle first applied to Posidonius, that is, only to elucidate teachings
explicitly attributed to him. Except for Bonhoffer's often brief and sporadic
remarks, and some paragraphs in Gould's book, there has been no
comprehensive account of Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus.
The most obvious feature of Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus is that
his works were read and discussed in Epictetus' school at Nicopolis. At 1.
4. 14, in a diatribe on moral improvement or progress (npoKOTrri), Epictetus
refers to On Impulse (Flepl op^fjc;), the title of a work by Chrysippus known
only from this passage. Again, at 2. 17. 34, there is reference to
Chrysippus' On the Liar (Uepi xot) \|/e\)6o)j,£vou), a subject on which he is
Arrian's Discourses ofEpictetus. Sec Arrian ofNicomedia (Chapel Hill, NC 1980) 26-29 and
202 for the relevant bibliography. All translations of the Discourses are those of W. A.
Oldfather, Epictetus I and 11, in the Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, reprinted 1979
and 1985 respectively).
^Although old, I. Bruns, De schola Epicteti (Kiel 1897) remains useful. B. Hijmans,
AIKHIII: Notes on Epictetus' Educational System (Assen 1959), F. Millar, "Epiclelus and the
Imperial Court," JRS 55 (1965) 141-48 and P. Brunt, "From Fpictetus lo Arrian," Athenaeum
55 (1977) 19—48 also have good observations on Epictetus' school.
' The works of Bonhoffer referred to are: Epictet und die Stoa (Stuttgart 1890) and Die
Ethik des Stoikers Epictet (Stuttgart 1894). His Epiktel und das Neue Testament (Giessen
1911) is not used in this study.
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reported to have written six books addressed to Aristocreon, his nephew
(D.L. 7. 196). Several other books were composed by Chrysippus on the
Mentiens Argument (ibid.), and at 3. 9. 21 Epictetus mentions the syllogism
called "The Liar," most likely with Chrysippus in mind.^ (There is also
mention of "The Denier," an argument whose formulation is unknown,
though Chrysippus wrote two works on "Denial" [D.L. 7. 197].)
In addition to references to these treatises, there are other passages
which suggest that Chrysippus was read in Epictetus' school: At 1. 4. 5
Epictetus remarks that making progress in virtue, and achieving serenity
(e-upoia), do not consist in reading many treatises of Chrysippus, or having
knowledge of his thought; in order to be a philosopher one must do more
than read Chrysippus (2. 16. 34), and "we shall never even come near to
making progress, even if we go through all the introductions and treatises of
Chrysippus, with those of Antipater and Archedemus thrown in" (2. 17. 40).
It is especially important to value one's moral purpose (jipoaipeoK;), and
not to be concerned about making good impressions by having read
Chrysippus or Antipater (3. 2. 13). It is also important to assimilate the
principles learned, to show change in one's own governing principle (to
fiyefxoviKov), and not to worry about lecturing on Chrysippus' doctrines "as
no one else can" (3. 21. 7). Still another passage in the Encheiridion (49)
suggests that not only were Epictetus' students reading Chrysippus, btit they
boasted about comprehending him: "When someone gives himself airs
because he can understand and interpret Chrysippus' books, say to yourself,
'If Chrysippus had not written obscurely (doacpox;), this man would have no
reason to give himself airs'." As will be seen, if Arrian's notes can be
trusted, Epictetus himself may not always have understood Chrysippus.
For the moment, it is clear that the previous passages are evidence for
the availability of Chrysippus' works to Epictetus and to his students. He
clearly knew some of Chrysippus' writings at first hand^ and any assessment
of Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus needs to acknowledge this fact. But
beside passages where Epictetus refers to Chrysippus' treatises, there is
other evidence for Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus: For example, Aulus
Gellius refers to Epictetus' Discourses "arranged by Arrianus, and no doubt
in agreement with writings of Zeno and Chrysippus" {quas ab Arriano
* Recently, in "npoaipecn<; in Epictetus," Ancient Philosophy 1 1 (1991) 1 1 1-35, R. Dobbin
rightly remarked that Epictetus is one of the "best sources" for this argument, "which figured in
the debate on fate and responsibility" (126).
' The impression given by ancient authors of an impoverished Epictetus, e.g. Simplicius,
who reports that "even his dwelling in Rome needed no boll for the door since there was
nothing within except for a straw mattress and rush mat" {In Epicl. 9), merits some doubt.
Since Arrian has Epictetus quoting from, or referring to, works of Chrysippus and other ancient
authors, e.g. Xenophon and Plato, sometimes verbatim, it seems that either he or his students
owned books, or had ready access to them. Indeed, his remarks at 4. 10. 26 suggest that he had
a library, though he may simply put himself in the place of a prosperous inquirer. See Hijmans
(above, note 6) 3.
142 Illinois Classical Studies 18 (1993)
digeslas congruere scriptis Zenonis et Chrysippi non dubium est, 19. 1. 14-
21). Whatever the faults of Gellius, he was learned, and his report seems in
keeping with the general contents of Epictetus' diatribes. A second passage,
from Epictetus himself (1. 17. 16), is probably more important, but not as
laudatory of Chrysippus as is sometimes suggested: Epictetus (or someone
else) turned to Chrysippus as a guide to or interpreter of nature (e^riyrixTic;
Tri<; cp-uoEox;), but discovered that his views also needed interpretation. *° As
Oldfather noted, Epictetus perhaps puts himself in place of a Roman pupil
who would understand Chrysippus more easily if he had written in Latin.''
So far, Epictetus appears to be critical of Chrysippus: He wrote obscurely,
and needs interpretation. Such a negative assessment of Chrysippus,
however, may not be that of Epictetus himself, and is at variance with other
passages where Chrysippus is mentioned. For example, in a somewhat
obscure passage (1. 10. 8 ff.), Epictetus suggests that he read and reflected
on certain texts before meeting his students, and so learned from Chrysippus
about the administration or arrangement of the cosmos (fi xov) kooiiox)
5ioiKTiai<;), and the place of rational beings in it. In a previously cited
passage (1. 17. 17 f.), Chrysippus (or any Stoic thinker) is said to interpret
nature ((pvaiq), but if the philosopher does not "follow" (dKo?io\)0ei) it, he
does not deserve praise. This and other remarks in his diatribes show
Epictetus' concern not only for right thinking, but also for right conduct.
Earlier it was suggested that Epictetus may not always have understood
Chrysippus. Gould, for example, refers to "the bewildered Epictetus'
remark" at 2. 17. 34: "I wish to know what Chrysippus means in his treatise
on The Liar."^'^ But, as Oldfather correctly translated the passage, the
remark is not Epictetus', but that of an inquirer. '^ That Gould took it as
Epictetus' own probably results from reliance on von Amim's quotation in
SVF (II 280, cited by Gould) which gives no context, only the quotation
itself, and so creates not only an impression that Epictetus misunderstood
Chrysippus, but was not well versed in logic. Logic was, of course,
Chrysippus' specialty (more than a third of his writings, or some 311
volumes listed by Diogenes Laertius, dealt with logic), and he
systematically promoted its study. Owing to the loss of his works it is thus
often hard to know if complaints about Chrysippus' obscurity or
inconsistency arise because of the complexities of his logical studies, or
because of his "inelegant," or sometimes incorrect, Greek style. Moreover,
there is not much evidence in Epictetus' diatribes as to how logic was taught
^^ See Gould (above, note 1)13 and Bonhoffer, Epiclel and die Stoa (above, note 7) 16 on
this passage.
" Oldfather (above, nole 5) I 1 17 n. 3.
'^Gouid (above, note 1)88.
'^ See Oldfather (above, note 5) I 346 for the old sophism: "If a person says, 'I am lying,'
does he lie or tell the truth? If he is lying, he is IclUng the truth; if he is telling the truth, he is
lying."
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in his school (perhaps by handbooks, as Benson Mates suggested^'*), and,
most important, the diatribes sometimes give an impression that Epictetus
himself was not very interested in logic. 2. 19 suggests, for example,
indifference to the subject: Sections 1-4 are an exposition of the "Master
Argument," of which only two of its three propositions can be held at the
same time. Asked which pair he himself maintains, Epictetus replies: "I
don't know." Pressed further, he replies: "I don't know, and I was not
made for this purpose—to test my own external impression (cpavxaoia)
upon the subject . . ." But the belief that Epictetus disliked or was
indifferent to logic is false. Indeed, in his own probably original three-fold
division of philosophy (3. 2. 1 ff.), Epictetus includes logic under
"avoidance of error and rashness of judgment, and, in general, about cases
of assent." There is little evidence to show that Epictetus neglected the
study of logic; it was a vital part of his teaching, with difficult or much-
discussed problems reserved for more advanced students. Indeed, the
diatribes often presuppose knowledge of logic, e.g. at 4. 1. 61: "That is why
we even worship those persons [e.g. Caesar] as gods; for we consider that
what has power to confer the greatest advantage is divine. And then we lay
down the wrong minor premiss: 'This man has power to confer the greatest
advantage.' It needs must be that the conclusion from these premisses is
wrong too." •
On the whole, Epictetus' diatribes reveal no aversion or indifference to
logic as pursued by Chrysippus, but a very "practical" interest in it. After
all, logic was for Chrysippus and other Stoics the science of correct
reasoning and speech, and was essential to proper human conduct. Finally,
it is important to remember Phillip Dc Lacy's thesis that the dominant
principle of the organization of the diatribes is that ethics is subject to
logical analysis, and that Epictetus remained faithful to Chrysippus.^^ 1. 5-
8, which deal, for example, with hypothetical arguments and the reasoning
faculties, are an application of logic to ethics. But whether it can be
concluded from these diatribes and other passages that all were arranged
according to Stoic principles of logic, or that Arrian "veiled" the "logical
structure of Epictetus' ethics" under the diatribe form,'^ seems
unconvincing. Suffice it to note that Arrian (or Epictetus) did not omit
consideration of logic because it was very much a prerequisite for
understanding Stoic ethics and physics with their emphasis on rationality.
Thus far, it is clear that Epictetus knew Chrysippus' works at first hand
and that he was influenced by Chrysippus' devotion to logic. But it is
^* See B. Mates, Stoic Logic (Berkeley 1961) 8, who notes that not long after Chrysippus
handbooks commonly entitled "Introduction to Logic" (ziaayurfi] 6iaXcKTiKT|) had wide
circulation.
'^ See P. De Lacy, "The Logical Structure of the Ethics of Epictetus." CP 38 (1943) 1 12-
25.
De Lacy (previous note) 1 1
3
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difficult to go further in assessing the impact of Chrysippus' thought on
Epictetus. Here BonhOffer and Gould have nnade interesting, though not
always persuasive, suggestions. According to Gould, for example, the
distinction between "things in our power" (xa ecp' fmiv) and "things not in
our power" (xa otjk e(p' fiiiiv) had a "pivotal position" in Epictetus'
thinking, and this is certainly correct (see, for example, the very beginning
of the Encheiridion)}'^ If the report in Epiphanius Adv. haeres. 3. 2. 9 (3.
36) Diels p. 592 (= SVF I 177, p. 45) can be trusted, the distinction goes
back to Zeno. Chrysippus also employed a similar distinction in his effort
to reconcile human choice and fate. Indeed, Aulus Gellius quotes Cicero's
fragmentary De falo alNoct. Att. 1. 2. 15 (= SVF II 977): Chrysippus
aestuans laboransque, quonam <pacto> explicet etfato omnia fieri el esse
aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo. And Nemesius in De nat. horn. 35 (=
SVF II 991) ascribes to Chrysippus a similar distinction between "what is in
our power" (x6 ecp' fmiv; cf. Cicero's aliquid in nobis) and what happens
according to fate (x6 Ka9' el)iap|ievriv; cf. Cicero's/fl/o omnia fieri). Given
Cicero's report in Aulus Gellius, it seems certain that neither Gellius nor
Nemesius was influenced by his knowledge of Epictetus in reporting
Chrysippus' distinction and, in fact, there are two passages in the diatribes
which suggest that Epictetus was influenced by Chrysippus in making his
famous distinction: At 3. 24. 81, in a diatribe directed against yearning for
things not in our control (ov)k e(p' fijiiv), he refers to philosophical principles
(GecopTmaxa) presumably learned by his students, and asks: "How has
Chrysippus wronged you that you should prove by your own conduct his
labors to be useless?" It is tempting to think that what was learned involved
the e(p' Tijiiv principle. In another diatribe, 2. 6, on indifference
(d5ia(popia), Epictetus quotes Chrysippus at section 9 (= SVF II 191).
What purport to be Chrysippus' words are introduced by Epictetus' remark
that "if you always bear in mind what is your own and what is another's,
you will never be disturbed." Then follows the Chrysippus quotation:
As long as the consequences are not clear to me, I cleave ever to what is
better adapted to secure those things that are in accordance with nature; for
God himself has created me with the faculty of choosing things. But if I
really knew that it was ordained for me to be ill at this present moment, I
would even seek illness; for the foot also, if it had a mind, would seek to
be covered with mud.
It seems that underlying Epictetus' initial remark and the supporting
quotation of Chrysippus is really the more basic distinction between what
one can control ("what is your own") and what one cannot control ("what
*' See Gould (above, note 1) 142 ff. The distinclion may ullimately have been a "general
principle" of Hellenistic philosophy. See the excellent introduction by M. Hossenfelder to Die
Philosophie der Antike ID, ed. W. Rod: Stoa, Epikureismus, and SkepsLs (Munich 1985) 11-41.
Among the Grundzuge of Hellenistic philosophy may be Epictetus' famous c<p' fmiv
distinclion.
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belongs to another"). Certainly the Chrysippus quotation involves a
distinction between what is fated (and thus not in our power) and what is
chosen (and so presumably in our power). But, without going into
Chrysippus' attempts to deal with fate and human choice, it seems that he
anticipated Epictetus' later famous distinction between "what is in our
power" and what is not.
Yet another instance where Chrysippus' "very doctrine" may inform
Epictetus is the latter's belief that "of beings whose constitutions
(Kaxaoicevai) are different, the works and the ends (xeX,Ti) are different" (1.
6. 16-17).'^ Underlying this belief is possibly Chrysippus' view {SVF III
20) that for each kind (genus) of living being there is a faculty peculiar to it,
and whose development (and functioning) constitutes the excellence or
virtue of the individuals in that kind (in eo genere). In the case of human
beings, this excellence or virtue consists in living in accord with reason
{SVF III 16). In fact, expressions such as "life according to reason" are
equivalent to "life in accord with nature," "to live a morally good life," etc.
Some of this is Aristotelian, and one cannot be sure whether it was the
Stagirite or Chrysippus who influenced Epictetus in this passage. After all,
Aristotelian influence on Epictetus' doctrine of moral choice (npoaipeoK;)
seems almost certain. ^^ In any case, this is one of several passages in
Epictetus where "Chrysippcan" influence may exist although Chrysippus
himself is not mentioned. And at this point we reach an area where
sometimes only speculation is possible, and this concerns the problems of
assessing one thinker's influence on another when there is little direct
evidence. It is a problem to which Epictetus would most likely have given
little attention because he was convinced that he was simply an heir to and
propagator of the teachings of ancient Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus,
who especially furnished books that provide harmony with nature and
subsequent tranquility (1. 4. 28 ff.). This passage, almost a hymn of praise
to Chrysippus, underscores his importance for Epictetus: He "brought to
light and imparted to all human beings the truth which deals, not with mere
life, but with a good life—who among you has for that set up an altar in his
honor, or dedicated a temple or a statue, or bows down to God in gratitude
for him?" One is perhaps reminded of Lucretius' similar adulation of
Epicurus. Yet there is little justification for some of Bonhoffer's remarks,
e.g. that Chrysippus' works "bilden fur seinen [Epictcts] Unterricht und
seine Homileen [sic] in ahnlichen Weise die Grundlage fur die chrisiliche
Predigt."^^ More persuasive are Bonhoffer's comments on Epictetus'
'^ Gould (above, note 1)117 seems a bit loo confident.
" See Dobbin's essay (above, note 8), which rightly emphasizes Aristotle's influence on
Stoicism. F. H. Sandbach's The Stoics (London 1975) seems odd in leaving Aristotle "almost
entirely out of account." npoaipeon; was an important concept for Anstotle, as any reader of
the Nicomachean Ethics knows.
^° Bonhoffer, Die Ethik (above, note 7) 2.
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teachings when, for example, he suggests that Epictetus was a true disciple
{Anhdnger) of Chrysippus in refuting Posidonius, and using lines from
Euripides' Medea to illustrate that every passion is an error (Verirrung) of
reason (Vernunft)}^ Bonhoffer shows here possible connections between
the philosophies of Chrysippus and of Epictetus. At the same time,
Bonhoffer's very learned comments, with sometimes scanty evidence to
support them, are not always convincing. In making this observation,
however, there is no intent to disregard Bonhoffer's valuable studies, but to
draw attention to them and to the possibility of further investigation of
Chrysippus' influence on Epictetus.
In conclusion, insofar as Epictetus' teachings conform to those of the
ancient Stoa, he was certainly influenced by Chrysippus. He knew works
by Chrysippus at first hand. These were read and commented on in his
school, and evidence of Chrysippus' influence can be seen in those passages
where Epictetus deals with formal logic; contrary to the impression
sometimes given, logic was for Epictetus, like Chrysippus before him, an
extremely important discipline. Epictetus' admiration for Chrysippus is
clear, and some teachings, such as his famous distinction between "what is
in our power" and "what is not," may well derive from Chrysippus. The
fragmentary state of the works of the Stoics, Chrysippus included, does,
however, create problems for tracing specific teachings of Epictetus to
Chrysippus. Indeed, singling out the doctrines of Chrysippus from those of
Zeno, for example, is not always an easy matter. There may thus be far
more of an influence of Chrysippus on Epictetus than has been shown in this
and other studies.^^
University ofMinnesota
^' Bonhoffer, Die Elhik (above, note 7) 4. See 1. 28. 6 ff. Neither Posidonius nor
Chrysippus is mentioned here by Epictetus. In fact, Posidonius is nowhere mentioned by him.
Oldfather was inclined to see 1. 9. 4-6 as a quotation from Posidonius, yet noted that similar
beliefs were ascribed to various Stoics and especially to Chrysippus. The "quotation" concerns
the Koivcovia of God and human beings by means of reason (Xoyoq). Here is another of those
possible influences of Chrysippus on Epictetus.
^^ A version of this study was presented in German at the Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin in November 1991, before its "Abwicklung." I wish to thank Rcimar Miiller for some
helpful comments.
